Torts--Libel--Privilege to Publish a Defamatory Grand Jury Report by Soyars, Tom
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 12
1956




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation




The word 'fair' has a well-recognized meaning, when thus used
to express the character of the report as an abridgement of the full
judicial proceedings. It is used to characterize the report in the sense
that it must be just and impartial as to the party complaining. The
report may be inaccurate, and yet not be unfair, . . . and in such
cases the defense of privilege would not be forfeited.... But the law
does not admit of degrees in the quality of the fairness of the report.
To come within the privilege, it must be fair and reasonably corre6t.10
(Writer's italics)
It is the writer's opinion that it should not be decided as a matter of
law that the publication complained of was a full and fair report of
the proceedings, or that the headlines read in connection with the
articles were not libelous. When a publication is so unambiguous as
to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say
whether or not it is defamatory. But if the publication is capable of
two meanings, one of which would render it libelous and actionable
and the other not libelous, it is for the jury to say, under all the cir-
cumstances surrounding publication, which of the two meanings would
be attributed to it by its readers. 1 It is believed by the writer to be
a question for the jury as to whether or not calling a person a rustler,
when he has only been charged with the crime, is actionable as exceed-
ing the bounds of fair newspaper comment. The liberty of the press
should not include imputation of actual guilt to a person who has
merely been accused of a crime. Where vituperation begins, the
liberty of the press should end.
ROBERT A. PALM-mR
TORTS-LIBEL-PRIVILEGE TO PUBUSH A DEFAMATORY GRAND JURY RE-
PORT-Plaintiffs, officers of the city of Hopkinsville, brought libel ac-
tions against defendants for publishing a report of a federal grand
jury accusing plaintiffs of being members of an extensive "vice ring."
The report had been published in full in the defendant newspaper's
regular editions. The individual defendant had read from the report
at a political meeting. Both defendants pleaded privilege on the
ground that the report was part of a judicial proceeding and that pub-
lication of it was privileged. Plaintiffs contended that the publication
was not privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding since the grand
jury had acted beyond its authority in issuing the report. The trial
court held for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed. Held: judg-
10 Id., 144 S.W. at 444.
11 Jones v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., supra note 9; Lane v. The Washington
Daily News, 85 F. 2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
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ment for defendant affirmed. Greenfield v. Courier Journal & Louis-
ville Times Co., 283 S.W. 2d 839 (Ky. 1955).
The plaintiffs, apparently conceding that reports of judicial pro-
ceedings are generally privileged, based their case chiefly on the
theory that the particular action of the grand jury was not a "judicial
proceeding," since, first, the grand jury had not returned an indictment
or an information, but had merely issued a "report" on conditions in
the city of Hopkinsville, and, second, the grand jury had no authority
to take any action since the matters inquired into were not proper
subjects for federal investigation. In its opinion the Court of Appeals
accepted, for purposes of argument, the plaintiffs contention that the
report was in fact unauthorized. The Court concluded, however,
that the publication of the report was nevertheless privileged.
It is believed that in so ruling the Court of Appeals adopted the
better view. Unless grand jurors are permitted to discharge their
duties without fear of being called to account in a subsequent libel
action for erroneous charges they might make, the machinery of justice
would be seriously impeded. Otherwise, grand juries, unless composed
of bankrupts or fools, would not comport themselves with the vigor
and diligence which their position requires. The grand jurors should
not be subjected to liability for mistake. That the particular mistake
is an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction should not alter the situa-
tion. In concluding that the grand jury was privileged even though,
by hypothesis, acting without jurisdiction, the Court has adopted the
position taken by most of the authorities.' In specifically repudiating
the rationale of the cases contra,2 instead of trying to distinguish the
cases, the court added to the clarity of the Kentucky law on the sub-
ject, and indicated its complete acceptance of the doctrine of absolute
privilege for grand jurors, even when acting outside the scope of their
real authority. Not only is this the better view; it is also the majority
view.3
The Court, having concluded that the officials making the report
would have been privileged, went on to exonerate the publishers of
the report with these words:
[Wihere a third party publishes a public record made in
the course of a judicial proceeding he is within the protection of the
I Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921); Hayslip v.
Wellford, 195 Tenn. 621, 263 S.W. 2d 136 (1953); RESTATEMENT, TORTS sec. 589,
comment c (1938) (Note that the Restatement rule protects the grand jurors only
if they reasonably believe they have jurisdiction); PRossER, ToRTs 610 (2d Ed.,
19552'Poston v. Washington, A., and Mt. V. Railway Co., 36 App. D.C. 359
(1911) which the Court refused to follow in the principal case at 841.
3 See note 1 supra.
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doctrine of privilege which protects the authors of the record....
[Tihe doctrine of absolute privilege is like a protective roof ex-
tending over judicial proceedings. If the immediate participants in
the act are protected, . .. those who do no more than republish the
record should not be adjudged guilty of wrongdoing.
4
By this language, it appears that the Court is virtually equating
the privilege of the publisher, the defendants here, with that of the
grand jurors-according to each an absolute privilege. But most au-
thorities hold that the publishers are only conditionally privileged,5
and that liability will attach if the privilege is exceeded, for example
where the publication is malicious. If the court is actually espousing
this doctrineO (that the privilege to publish reports of judicial pro-
ceedings is an absolute privilege) it is pioneering in the law, but in a
field where, it could be argued, some pioneering should be done.
7
It is more probable, however, that the court does not desire to
change the law on this subject, but is merely using the term "absolute
privilege" loosely, as it has done in the past.8 The term "absolute
privilege", if it is to have any meaning at all, must mean that the
privilege exists even though there is malice or knowledge of falsity.
4 Greenfield v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 283 S.W. 2d 839, 842
(Ky. 1955).
5 Sherwood v. Evening News Ass'n., 256 Mich. 318, 239 N.W. 305 (1931);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, see. 611; Psossam, supra note 1 624; 33 Am. Jun. 149
(1941); 53 C.J.S. 204 (1948).6 In the writer's opinion, the court was led into apparently equating the
privileges accorded the two separate parties because of the way it conceptualized
its solution to the first problem, i.e., the problem of whether the issuing of the
report was a part of a judicial proceeding. In its decision of this question the
court throughout talks of the report as being privileged. Such language is not
quite precise. A report is not privileged; a person, or a particular publication, is
privileged. But if the report itself is viewed as privileged, it almost inevitably
follows that any publication of it is also privileged. It is the writer's belief that
this was the logic used by the court in reaching the conclusion that the publishers
of the report were absolutely privileged.
7 It could be argued that the right of the people to know about what's going
on in the courts is almost as basic as the right to seek redress in the courts, and
that those who inform the people by publicizing court proceedings are entitled to
the same protection received by the more immediate parties involved, for example,
the grand jurors. Both are acting for the public interest. Where the privilege is
qualified, and therefore, according to present law, lost if there is malice against the
party defamed, the privilege in point of fact may be meaningless, since there is a
great risk that partisan witnesses can be found to furnish enough evidence of
malice to get to a jury. Furthermore, if the public is actually benefitted by pub-
licizing court proceedings, should malice destroy the privilege? It would seem that
it should not. These arguments for extending an absolute privilege to publishers
of judicial proceedings are not unanswerable, but they should not be overlooked.
8 See, for example, Begley v. Louisville Times Co., 272 Ky. 805 115 S.W. 2d
345 (1938) where the court at 818, 115 S.W. 2d at 351, says: "lIlt is evident
that the publication of the report by appellee, [the newspaper] in the form and
manner as shown by appellant's proof, falls in that limited class defined as abso-
lutely privilege." (Writer's italics). Note that in the earlier part of the opinion
at 813, 115 S.W. 2d at 349 the court quotes from the Restatement and calls this a
qualified privilege. Cf. Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S.W. 878 (1910)
where the true rule of absolute privilege is set out.
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The very word "absolute" means without conditions and without quali-
fications. To say that when certain conditions are present, there is an
absolute privilege, is almost a contradiction in terms. Furthermore,
most authorities have used the term "absolute privilege" in the sense
advocated by the writer.9 To some extent, therefore, the words are
"words of art" and the court does not seem to be speaking the lan-
guage used by most legal writers when it speaks of the privilege of a
publisher of judicial proceedings as "absolute."
It must be stressed, however, that the result reached by the case
was almost certainly correct, even though the court may have erred
in using the adjective "absolute" in describing the privilege involved.
Without malice, the publishers would be privileged, even under the
more limited protection afforded by the conditional privilege.'0 And
the facts involved here show no evidence of malice on the part of the
publishers. Furthermore, an examination of the judgment of the trial
court and of the briefs on appeal indicate a virtual concession by the
plaintiffs that there was no malice.
In conclusion, it is believed that the court has reached the proper
result in this case. In holding that the privilege was not vitiated by the
fact that the grand jury might not have had any real jurisdiction to
inquire into the matter, the court reached what is regarded as the
better rule and that in accord with the great weight of authority. In
affording the publishers of judicial proceedings a privilege in this
case, the court shows a high regard for the "right to know" so essential
in a democracy. For without this, or some similar privilege, attempting
to inform the people on these matters would be hazardous business.
In the writer's opinion, the court did not mean to alter the present
law in labeling the privilege of the defendants "absolute." The use
of the term "absolute" is unfortunate, however, in that it conveys this
impression. There is, of course, the possibility that the court meant
exactly what it said, and the case can serve as authority for making
the privilege to publish reports of judicial proceedings an absolute
privilege, a perhaps not unwarranted change in the law.
Tom SoYARs
9 See note 1 supra.
10 See note 5 supra. See also: Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 411.060 (1954); Begley v.
Louisville Times Co., supra note 8; Paducah Newspapers, Inc. v. Bratcher, 274
Ky. 220, 118 S.W. 2d 178 (1937).
